Many data mining applications operate in adversarial environment, for example, webpage ranking in the presence of web spam. A growing number of adversarial data mining techniques are recently developed, providing robust solutions under specific defense-attack models. Existing techniques are tied to distributional assumptions geared towards minimizing the undesirable impact of given attack models. However, the large variety of attack strategies renders the adversarial learning problem multimodal. Therefore, it calls for a more flexible modeling ideology for equivocal input. In this paper we present a Bayesian hierarchical mixtures of experts for adversarial learning. The technique groups data into soft partitions and fits simple function approximators, referred to as "experts", within each. Experts are ranked using gating functions for each input. Ambiguous input is predicted competitively by multiple experts, while unambiguous input is effectively predicted by a single expert. Optimal attacks minimizing the likelihood of malicious data are modeled interactively at both expert and gating levels in the learning hierarchy. We demonstrate that our adversarial hierarchicalmixtures-of-experts learning model is robust against adversarial attacks on both artificial and real data.
Introduction
Machine learning and data mining algorithms are increasingly being used in security applications such as intrusion detection, spam filtering and malware analysis. In these applications, statistical learning tools are built to discriminate between malicious data and legitimate data such as spam and legitimate e-mail in spam filtering. The presence of adversaries attempting to defeat these learning tools sets adversarial learning problems apart from traditional learning tasks. The adversarial nature of security applications makes a learning task significantly more complicated and challenging, often resulting an arms race between attacks and defenses.
Standard machine learning and data mining algorithms assume training data and test data follow identical distributions. In adversarial learning this assumption is frequently violated, which undermines the generality of trained learning models. As adversaries become more sophisticated, their abilities of making versatile attacks grow. As a result, learning tools used in security applications are facing increasingly unpredictable and rapidly changing attacks. This calls for more flexible modeling techniques to handle ambiguities in the corrupted input. In this paper, we present an adversarial learning framework using Bayesian hierarchical mixtures of experts (HME) as the baseline learning model. Our framework implements an optimal attack strategy that minimizes the likelihood of malicious data in each round of learning and a divide-and-conquer learning model that counters this type of adversarial attack. The learning process resembles the two-sided arms race by interactively manipulating data against the classifier.
The hierarchical mixtures-of-experts is a treestructured probabilistic learning model. Unlike standard decision trees such as ID3, HME provides a soft split of data in the input feature space, allowing data to lie in multiple nested regions. The learning task is therefore divided into a set of overlapping sub-tasks of smaller sizes that are solved by components of the mixtures. The internal nodes are referred to as gating networks that score the competence of the experts located at the terminal nodes, for each input. Both internal and terminal nodes are input-sensitive predictors. When the adversary modifies the input vector of a data point, the outputs of both gating networks and expert networks are affected. By corrupting the input, the adversary can either poison the solutions of sub-tasks defined on soft partitions of the input or divert data away from the most probable path it is generated.
In this paper, we consider adversarial attacks targeting the gating functions, the experts, and both. We model the adversary's optimal strategy using a set of hyper-parameters in the kernel function. Learning proceeds as it searches for model parameters that best counter the optimal attacks. Our main contribution is a divide-and-conquer adversarial learning framework inherited from the mixtures-of-experts architecture. More specifically, our contributions include:
1.) a multimodal discriminative model for adversarial learning using sparse Bayesian Hierarchical mixtures of experts;
2.) optimal attack strategies against both gating networks and expert networks in the mixture model;
3.) an adversarial maximum log-likelihood learning process that models optimal adversarial attacks ab intra.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses recent related work on adversarial learning. Section 3 reviews hierarchical mixtures of experts and sparse Bayesian learning. In Section 4 we present our adversarial learning framework with sparse Bayesian hierarchical mixtures of experts. We discuss our experimental results in Section 5 and conclude our work and discuss future directions in Section 6.
Related Work
Adversarial learning problems have been modeled as Stackelberg games between two opponents. Kantarcioglu et al. [17] solve for a Nash equilibrium using simulated annealing and the genetic algorithm to discover an optimal set of attributes. Additional results on improved Nash strategies can be found in Bruckner & Scheffer, and Liu & Chawla's work [6, 20] . Brückner and Scheffer [7] later presented another Stackelberg game strategy that does not require a unique equilibrium. Cost-sensitive opponents have also been introduced to the game theoretic framework for adversarial learning [8] . The problem is modeled as a game between two optimal opponents. Given a cost function, the adversary transforms an instance for which the cost is minimized. The algorithm predicts according to the class that maximizes the conditional utility.
Other varieties of research on adversarial learning consider training-time attacks and test-time attacks. Poisoning attacks are training-time attacks, also known as causative attacks. They influence a classifier by corrupting its training data. Poisoning attacks against support vector machines have been recently studied by Biggio et al. [4] . They propose to inject specially crafted training data that significantly increases the error of the SVM classifier. They develop a gradient-ascent attack strategy against the optimal solution of the SVM. Other work on poisoning attacks can also be found [18, 23, 3] .
Robust learning against test-time attacks has been increasingly studied recently. Zhou et al. [26] present an adversarial learning algorithm for support vector machine learning. They propose two attack models in terms of the adversary's capabilities of modifying data. They develop an optimal learning strategy for each attack model and solve a convex optimization problem in each strategy. Empirical results demonstrate that their adversarial SVM model is more robust against adversarial attacks than SVM and one-class SVM. More recently, they propose another adversarial learning model for sparse Bayesian learning [27] . They use a sparse relevance vector machine (RVM) ensemble in which the input feature space of each RVM is controlled by a kernel vector. Optimal attacks are modeled as feature space transformation that minimizes the likelihood of the malicious samples. Learning proceeds as re-estimation of model parameters and kernel parameters. Empirical results demonstrate that their RVM ensemble model is more resilient to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we also apply kernel parameters to both terminal and nonterminal nodes in the hierarchical mixtures of experts. Instead of solving an ensemble on the entire learning task, we allow the adversary to independently or simultaneously attack sub-tasks of the learning problem.
Several other techniques have been proposed for handling classification-time noise [19, 24, 9, 10] . Globerson and Roweis [13] consider optimal SVM learning with test-time malicious feature deletion. They develop a learning strategy that outputs an optimal classifier under a given constraint by solving a convex optimization problem to find the zero-sum minimax strategy. El Ghaoui et al [11] also present a minimax strategy for adversarial learning in which training data is bounded by hyper-rectangles. Lowed and Meek [21] develop a costbased reverse-engineering strategy to find the instance with minimal adversarial cost.
Bayesian Hierarchical Mixtures of Experts
For a better understanding of our adversarial learning framework discussed in later sections, we briefly review the hierarchical mixtures of experts and sparse Bayesian learning in this section.
Hierarchical Mixtures of Experts
The architecture of the hierarchical mixtures of experts (HME) is a probabilistic tree. Gating networks are located at the non-terminals, providing soft split of the input feature space. Data points are therefore grouped into soft partitions and are allowed to lie in multiple regions simultaneously. This technique effectively ameliorates the variance-increasing problem often encountered in a divide-and-conquer problem [16] . Expert networks located at the terminals solve the subproblems defined by the soft partitions of the input.
} be N input vectors and their corresponding targets. Let φ(x) be the basis functions defined by a kernel function K(x (i) , x (j) ). Let v i be the weight vector of the i th gate at the top-level gating network. Let ξ i = v T i ·φ(x). The output of the top-level gating network is the softmax of ξ i :
where M is the number of expert networks at the terminals. Gating networks at lower levels are similarly defined:
where j|i is the j th gate in the i th gating network, and
At the terminals the output vector of the j th expert network under the i th non-terminal is a generalized linear function of φ(x):
The output at each non-terminal i is the weighted sum of the experts below the non-terminal:
and the output of the root is:
The probability of y given x is:
where θ includes gating parameters and expert parameters and P ij (y) is the density of y given the true value of θ. HME [14, 16, 15] has wide applications and is known for its excellent convergence time on small to medium sized learning tasks [12] . Recently an efficient solution has also been proposed for large scale input in computer vision [5] .
Sparse Bayesian Experts
We choose the sparse Bayesian learning model to build the expert networks. The weights of the experts have zero-mean Gaussian priors controlled by hyper parameters α:
Learning proceeds as iterative re-estimation of the mostprobable hyperparameter values of α and w i .
Adversarial Learning with Sparse Bayesian Hierarchical Mixtures of Experts
We consider the following adversarial learning problem in which an adversary alters malicious data to evade detection at test time. Here the traditional assumption that training data and test data follow identical distributions is violated.
where X ⊆ R d , y i ∈ {−1, 1} and there exists an adversary A at test time that transforms a malicious data point x| y=1 to a (likely) legitimate one by adding a displacement vector ∆x to x| y=1 .
We now present our adversarial HME learning model AD-HME. The basic idea of our method is to take into consideration optimal malicious data transformation at training time. Our AD-HME learning algorithm models attacks ab intra as if the adversary were present at the time of model training. The learning process simulates an arms race between the classifier and the (imaginary) adversary. From the adversary's perspective, every time an optimal parameter set of HME is found, the adversary attacks in response to the new predictive model by transforming the malicious data points to the most likely legitimate ones. This is accomplished through updating a kernel parameter vector that regulates data transformation in the feature space. A malicious data transformation is most effective when it maximally reduces the likelihood of the malicious data points in a dataset. From the classifier's perspective, after every attempt of malicious data transformation a new HME model needs to be re-trained to counter this type of attack. The process repeats until a predefined equilibrium is reached, for example, when the adversary has no further incentive to transform data because of high cost or when the classifier stops further re-training because of high false positive rate.
Let N be the total number of data points and M be the number of experts. The complete log-likelihood (Q-function) is given in [16] and defined as follows:
and P m is the probability density of y in the m th expert network, L g is the summation of the terms h We apply a kernel parameter vector η to each expert and gate network to kernelize the input space and simulate adversarial attacks. The adversary's objective is to find the kernel parameter vectors that minimize the likelihood of the malicious data given a learned HME model. By introducing a kernel parameter vector to the input at each node in the hierarchy, the adversary can influence the basis function φ by weakening the set of discriminating features of the malicious data. For simplicity, we work out the adversarial learning model of a single level of expert network.
Attacking Expert Networks
We use the sparse Bayesian learning method with Gaussian kernels [25] to train the expert networks. For regression the marginal likelihood of the experts is:
The gradient of the likelihood L p (α) with respect to the k th kernel parameter η k is:
where
For binary classification with logistic sigmoid output, the likelihood of the expert is:
where σ i is the logistic sigmoid output given input x. The gradient of L p (α) with respect to η k is:
With the gradient ∂L p /∂η k , our adversarial learning proceeds as we search for
where θ includes the learning model (the expert parameters w, α) and the attack model (the kernel parameter η), and
2 is the square loss and
m P j (y i ). The learning process is best understood as an arms race between the expert and the adversary: given expert parameters (w, α), the adversary finds an η that minimizes the likelihood of the malicious data points, referred to as positive ('+') data points in the input. Note that in the minimization term in Equation (4.2) the adversary also attempts to minimize the square loss of the output. This may sound counter intuitive since minimizing training loss is not to the best interest of the adversary. A greedy adversary would attempt to maximize the loss of all malicious points. However, a simple validation on the training set would disclose the adversary's attempts. Therefore, the adversary's objective is to minimize the likelihood of malicious data and keep the attacks stealthy by maintaining minimum losses during training.
Attacking Gating Networks
We use separate kernel parameters to control the input to the gating functions. The log-likelihood of the gating function is:
Rewrite Equation (4.3) as:
where h m is the posterior and defined as:
, and h m is estimated in the E-step in the Bayesian EM learning algorithm. We use the Gaussian kernel to compute the basis function:
where d is the number of dimensions in the input space. The gradient of the likelihood L g with respect to η k is:
Learning proceeds as iterative re-estimation of: (1) v that maximizes L g given η, and (2) η that minimizes L + g given v until the algorithm convergences.
Experimental Results
We compare our adversarial HME learning algorithm to the following algorithms: the standard hierarchical mixtures of experts (HME), relevance vector machine (RVM) and its adversarial learning counterpart (AD-RVM), support vector machine (SVM) and its one-class learning counterpart (1-class SVM). We use a single level HME with two expert networks in our experiments.
In order for apples-to-apples comparison, we repeat the experiments reported in [27] on one artificial data set and two real data sets. In these settings, the training data is clean, while the test datasets are corrupted by adversarial attacks modeled at increasingly intense levels. The intensity of attacks is controlled by the attack factor f attack as follows:
where is local random noise, x + and x − are a positive data point and a random negative data point in the test set. As f attack increases from 0 to 1 the intensity of attacks grows from none to the extreme where a malicious data point can be arbitrarily close to a legitimate data point, within a range of small random local noise. We compare six learning models: AD-HME, HME, AD-RVM, RVM, SVM, One-class SVM on the three data sets. All results reported are averaged over 10 random runs.
Experiments on Artificial Dataset
We generate the artificial data set following the same bivariate normal distribution with specified means (−5.0, −6.0) and (5.0, 6.0), and covariance matrix 1.0 0.5 0.5 2.0 as reported in [27] . Attacks on the test data are created using the attack model discussed in the aforementioned section. Table 1 illustrates the classification error rates for the six algorithms AD-HME, HME, AD-RVM, RVM, 1-class SVM and SVM. We assume the training data is unaffected by the adversary. For our AD-HME algorithm, we present the results of three strategies: AD-HME (exp) where we model attacks against expert networks, AD-HME (gate) where we model attacks against gating networks, and AD-HME (exp+gate) that combines the two. The results are shown in Table 1 . The best among the six algorithms are bolded. Experimental results reported in Table 1 reveal several interesting observations:
1. All three adversarial HME algorithms AD-HME (exp), AD-HME (gate) and AD-HME (exp+gate) The x-axis is the input to the gating functions and the y-axis is the posterior of each expert (approximating "+" and "-" data respectively).
show significant improvement over the standard HME algorithm.
2. AD-HME (gate) clearly outperforms all the other five learning algorithms. Note that gating functions rank the competence of experts in classifying a data point. AD-HME (gate) adaptively selects the expert that is most likely to generate the data point as shown in Figure 1 .
3. AD-HME (exp) and AD-RVM are both sparse Bayesian adversarial learning models and their results are comparable; however, AD-RVM consistently demonstrates slightly better error rates. The reason AD-HME (exp) underperforms is that the experts are located at the bottom of the hierarchy. Table 1 : Error rates of HME, AD-HME (exp, gate, exp+gate), RVM, AD-RVM, SVM, and 1-class SVM on the artificial data set. The best results are bolded. The gating networks at the higher levels may not always select the most competent expert. Therefore, modeling attacks at the lower level of the hierarchy is less effective.
4. AD-HME (expert + gate) cannot outperform AD-HME (gate). For some data points AD-HME (exp) and AD-HME (gate) combined may overcompensate for fears of adversarial attacks.
The probability distributions of AD-HME (gate) at the gate on the test data are shown in Figure 1 . It illustrates how the probability that the test data is generated by each expert adapts when the intensity of attacks increases as f attack = 0 → 0.1 → 0.5 → 0.9. Figures 2-4 illustrate classification of the artificial data with HME and AD-HME (gate) as the strength of attacks increases (f attack = 0.1 → 0.5 → 0.9). Malicious data points are represented as positive data labeled as '+' in the figures. Negative points representing legitimate instances are labeled as black dots. False positives are negative data points classified as positive; they are represented as white circles in the figures. False negatives are malicious data points that have successfully evade detection; they are represented as hollow stars in the figures.
We now summarize the general properties of adversarial learning algorithms:
• When the attack is not intense, adversarial learning algorithms may have no apparent superiority over standard learning algorithms as shown in Figure 2 . Perhaps more importantly, adversarial learning algorithms should avoid going overboard on counterattacking the adversary and sacrifice the generality of the learning model.
• Adversarial learning algorithms are more resilient to attacks with moderate intensity, for example, the learning problem shown in Figure 3 . Performance (a) HME as f attack = 0.1 (b) AD-HME (gate) as f attack = 0.1 Figure 2 : Classification results of HME and AD-HME (gate) on the artificial data set with adversarial attacks when f attack = 0.1.
may still drop compared to learning with no adversaries. However, adversarial learning algorithms typically perform significantly better than standard learning algorithms.
• When trained for handling extremely intense attacks, adversarial learning algorithms should keep a balance between robustness and the cost of false In theory the hierarchical architecture of the HME model is subject to multi-point attacks, thus we let each node have its own set of kernel parameters, independently simulating adversarial attacks by transforming malicious data in the input space into legitimate data in the feature space. The AD-HME algorithm counters the attack by learning a new set of model parameters to maximize the likelihood of the transformed data. If this process continues indefinitely, the algorithm essentially explores the entire spectrum of the intensity of adversarial attacks. In practice, the attacks are only effective if they stay stealthy during training. A naïve adversary would completely eliminate all unique features of malicious data in the input space in the hope that all malicious points would evade detection. A more sophisticated adversary would avoid this greedy attempt so that the attacks will remain unnoticed.
(a) HME with f attack = 0.9 (b) AD-HME (gate) f attack = 0.9 Figure 4 : Classification results of HME and AD-HME (gate) on the artificial data set with f attack = 0.9.
From the empirical results on the artificial data, we can see that adversarial learning algorithms that adapt to optimal attacks during training have a better chance against adversarial attacks. Both AD-HME (exp) and AD-RVM simulate attacks against individual experts and have encouraging results. Compared to AD-RVM, our AD-HME (exp) algorithm is not as sensitive as the AD-RVM algorithm to the initialization of kernel parameters. More importantly, AD-HME (exp) does not use ad-hoc choice of a constant ρ to control overcompensating issues as in AD-RVM [27] . Our AD-HME (gate) algorithm clearly outperforms AD-RVM especially when attacks are intense.
Experiments on Real Datasets
The spam data set is taken from the UCI data repository [2] . Among the 4601 e-mail samples, 39.4% is spam. Each e-mail has 57 attributes and a class label that is either '+' or '-' corresponding to spam and legitimate e-mail. We divide the data set for training and testing. Training data and test data are non-overlapping. We randomly select 5% of the training data for training and test each trained classifier on the entire test set. We report error Table 2 : Classification error rates of HME, AD-HMEs, RVM, AD-RVM, SVM, and one-class SVM on the spambase dataset. Attacks are generated with f attack = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9. The best results are bolded. Table 2 . Oneclass SVM was superior when f attack ≤ 0.5, which is consistent with previously reported results [27] . AD-RVM outperformed others when f attack = 0.7. AD-HME (gate) gained the best result when f attack = 0.9. Overall, the adversarial learning algorithms all managed to outperform their baseline algorithms significantly.
The uni-gram web spam data set is taken from the LibSVM website [1] . We cut down the number of attributes from 254 to 50 using the minimumredundancy-maximum-relevance feature selection technique (mRMR) [22] . We divide the 350,000 instances evenly into training and test sets. In each run 2% of the samples were randomly selected for training and the results are averaged over 10 random runs. Table 3 shows the error rates of the six algorithms as the strength of attacks increases. The AD-HME algorithms were superior to others in all cases. Their superiority is also attributed to the baseline HME algorithm that significantly outperformed SVM and RVM. Nevertheless, the AD-HME algorithms consistently outperformed the baseline HME algorithm in all cases.
Conclusions and Future Work
We present an adversarial learning framework using the hierarchical mixtures of experts. We interactively search for feature space transformations that minimize the likelihood of malicious data given parameters of the baseline learning model. In each round of learning, we model the adversary's best strategy of attacking the current trained learning model. Empirical results demonstrate that our AD-HME learning model is robust against adversarial attacks. Compared to AD-RVM, our AD-HME algorithm does not require setting a constant ρ to control overcompensating issues and AD-HME can model attacks more efficiently at the gate levels in the divide-and-conquer fashion. In the future, we plan to investigate influences of attacks against terminals and non-terminals at different levels and use mixtures of different learning algorithms in the expert networks.
